Understanding efficiency of agrarian organisation by Bachev, Hrabrin
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Understanding efficiency of agrarian
organisation
Hrabrin Bachev
December 2009
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/19477/
MPRA Paper No. 19477, posted 21. December 2009 06:09 UTC
UNDERSTANDING EFFICIENCY OF AGRARIAN 
ORGANISATION 
 
HRABRIN BACHEV∗  
 
ABSTRACT 
  
In this paper we incorporate achievements of interdisciplinary New Institutional and Transaction Costs 
Economics (combining Economics, Organization, Law, Sociology, Behavioral and Political Sciences) 
into analysis of agrarian organizations and suggest a framework for evaluating efficiency of different 
governing structures in agriculture. This new approach includes: study of farm and other agrarian 
organizations as a governing rather than production structure; assessment of comparative efficiency of 
alternative (market, contract, internal, hybrid) modes of governance; analysis of level of transaction 
costs and their institutional, behavioral (agents preferences, bounded rationality, tendency for 
opportunism), dimensional (frequency, uncertainty, assets specificity, and appropriability of 
transactions), and technological factors; determination of effective horizontal and vertical boundaries of 
farms, and other agrarian organizations; the specification of the economic role of the government and 
the effective forms of public interventions in agrarian sector. The paper provides new effective tools for 
improvement of agrarian public policies, farming and business strategies, and academic analysis. 
 
KEY WORDS: agrarian governance, efficiency of farms and agrarian organizations, agrarian 
policies, transaction costs, new institutional and transaction costs economics 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The issue of criteria and approaches for evaluating efficiency of agrarian organizations is 
among the most debated in economic theory and practices [1, 2]. It has been especially topical 
for countries in transition around the globe [2, 3]. The question of efficiency is often 
politicized as unilateral priority is given to a particular type of organization - free market, 
private farming, family farm, cooperative etc. In more profound analyses efficiency is assessed 
on the base of productivity of resources use in various types of organizations. At the same time, 
no answer is given to fundamental question: why there have been highly sustainable 
“inefficient” organizations in Europe and Asia throughout transition now - unproductive 
subsistence and semi-market farms, production cooperatives with profitability several times 
lower than private farms, inefficient contractual arrangements etc. 
 
The New Institutional Economics is a new developing methodology which explains existence 
and efficiency of economic organizations with their role to maximize transaction benefits and 
minimize transaction costs [4, 5, 6]. Divers type of farms and contractual modes are 
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considered as alternative governance (rather than production) structures – forms for governing 
relationships between different agrarian agents [1]. In this paper we incorporate achievements 
of that new developing interdisciplinary concept into analysis of agrarian organizations and 
suggest a framework for evaluating efficiency of different governing structures in agriculture. 
Our ultimate goal is to provide new tools for improvement of public policies, farming and 
business strategies, and academic analyses in that important sector of social life.   
 
2. THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH 
 
Broadly applied traditional approach for evaluating efficiency of economic organizations is 
based on assessment of efficiency of production costs and productivity of employed recourses. 
Accordingly, a great number of indicators are used to express efficiency of organizations 
through determining the level of use of factors (land, labor, capital), rate of return (pay-back, 
profitability) of current and long-term expenditures etc1. In more sophisticated (Neoclassical) 
models criteria for assessment of efficiency of organization is derived from the equilibrium 
condition of entire economic system - when marginal benefits are equalized with marginal 
costs 2 . The organizations using recourses with different (higher, lower) from marginal 
productivity are inefficient – e.g. if a farm has higher productivity than the social level 
(employing resources more effectively than other organizations) but it does not further invest 
resources to explore effective internal potential - then it is inefficient. Contrary, if a farm is 
performing with lower productivity, it means that it integrates more recourses than it can 
effectively manage (which could be effectively used by others), and therefore it is inefficient. 
 
However, traditional approach does not answer the question: why there exist so many 
organizations with different productivity of resources utilization. If efficiency of a particular 
organization in low, there will always be private or social mechanism (competition, central 
planning) for reallocation of resources to more effective application - optimization, 
specialization, extension, or liquidation of organization. In a foreseeable long run there will 
exist only “effective” organizations, which govern resources on (or close to) the socially 
acceptable level of efficiency. What is more, traditional approach estimates different 
organizations without even looking for answering the question: why there exist so big variety 
of types of economic organizations in agriculture (one-person farms, group farms, 
cooperatives and firms of different kind, subsistent farms, small and large farms).  
 
 
 
                                                       
1 E.g. profitability of Bulgarian cooperatives has been 5 times lower than in private farms [7]. 
2 That definition of efficiency (Pigou) is found in all Economics textbooks. “It is a central 
characteristic of welfare economics that outcomes derived from the basic neoclassical model 
are used as a criterion of efficiency. Outcomes that deviate from outcomes in model based on 
fully defined exclusive rights and costless transactions are called "inefficient" [8]. 
3. THE NEW APPROACH 
 
New Institutional Economics explains existence of different agrarian organizations in their role 
to govern transactions between individual agents [9, 10]. Usually carrying out individual 
transacting (land and labor supply; marketing) is associated with significant costs - for finding 
best prices and partners; negotiation; contract writing; registration; enforcement of contacted 
terms; disputing including through a court system etc. Thus, economic efficiency of agrarian 
organizations should take into account not only their capacity to minimize production costs, 
but also their ability to economize on transaction costs [1]. “Indeed it is obvious that once 
there is shift from a “frictionless” universe scare resources have to be used to effect 
transactions, protect property rights and so on. This means that system’s total resource 
endowment can no longer be devoted solely to the production of normal commodities” [11]. 
Moreover, both (current) costs for using of transacting forms and long-term costs for their 
development (initiation, modernization, liquidation) have to be taken into account [1]. 
 
If execution of transactions was not associated with costs ("zero" transaction costs) then the 
mode of organization would have no economic importance [4]. Agrarian agents would govern 
their relationships with the same (equal) efficiency though free market (prices movements), 
and private organizations of different types (contracts, firms), and collective decision making 
(cooperative, association), and in a nationwide hierarchy (single private or state company). 
Then technological opportunities for economies of scale and scope (maximum productivity of 
resources) would be easily achieved. All information for the effective potential of transactions 
(optimization of resources, satisfying new demands) would be costlessly obtained by 
everybody, and individual agents would costlessly trade available resources in mutual benefit 
until exhausting potential for increasing productivity (’Pareto optimum/efficiency”). 
 
However, often high transaction costs make difficult or block otherwise efficient (mutually 
beneficial) for all parties transactions. For instance, despite the great pay-off of investments in 
agrarian research and innovation, market and private agents do not organize such activity 
because of their high uncertainty and low market and private appropriability [12]. Since 
carrying out transactions is connected with costs, rational agents will seek, chose, and develop 
such modes for organization of their activity and exchanges which maximize their transacting 
benefits and minimize associated costs. The type of organization is crucial since various 
governing structures give unequal possibilities for participants to coordinate and adapt 
transactions, stimulate acceptable behavior of counterparts, protect their rights and investments 
from unwanted expropriation. Therefore, in the long-run inefficient forms will be abandoned 
and only effective modes for organization of agrarian transactions will dominate. 
 
Each transaction has different specific dimensions varying according to institutional 
environment (legislation, efficiency of public contract enforcement, other formal and informal 
restrictions), personal characteristics of agents (preferences, experience, reputation, tendency 
for opportunism, risk aversion), and macroeconomic conditions (stability, foreign trade regime 
etc.) [4, 13]. Since there exist no singe most efficient (universal) form for organization of all 
transactions, depending on critical dimensions of each transactions agrarian agents will use 
appropriate (most effective) mode for governance. Hence, in any particular moment agrarian 
activities will be carried out (governed) through a great variety of organizational structures: 
some will be governed by “invisible hand of market”, some will be carried out through a 
special contract mode (“private order”), some will be managed within hierarchy (under 
"visible hand of manager"), some will be supported by a third party (Government, NGO`s, 
international assistance), some would require more complicated and mixed modes [1].  
 
Thus it must be abandoned commonly used (nirvana) approach for evaluating different form as 
“good” or “bad” for their own or in comparison with some no existed ideal (without 
transaction costs, model in other countries) [14]. Evaluation is to be directed to finding out the 
comparative advantages for initiating, establishing, and using; management, adaptation, 
intensification, coordination, stimulation and controlling (in short - for minimization of overall 
costs) of transactions, of alternative (and really possible) modes for governing of different 
transactions in the specific market, institutional, natural environment. For instance, in the 
condition of not well-defined and assigned private rights on farmland, and the high costs for 
their protection and exchange during post-communist transformation, the short-term lease and 
the internal integration (subsistence and semi-market farming, production cooperation) were 
the most efficient forms for organization of land supply in Bulgarian agriculture [7, 9]. 
 
Evaluation of efficiency of agrarian organizations has to include not only comparative 
“productivity” of resources, but analyses of the level and structure of comparative transacting 
costs. Besides, it should identify factors of transaction costs in nationwide (social) scale, 
which eventually slow down sustainable growth of agriculture, and lead to insufficient and 
unsustainable use of resources, underinvestment and low productivity in production, 
wide-spreading of primitive technologies, lack of innovations etc [5]. When a high level of 
costs for market and private transactions (which prevent or entirely block development of 
market and private forms) is observed then either a public intervention in agrarian transactions 
(assistance, regulation, in-house organization, partnership) or fundamental institutional 
modernization (e.g. introduction and enforcement of new private rights) should be undertaken.  
 
4. TRANSACTION – THE BASIC UNIT OF ANALYSES  
 
The new approach turns individual transaction and costs associated with them into a center of 
economic analysis [4, 9]. Following that new approach firstly, we have to determined major 
type of transactions in which agents managing agrarian activity (farm entrepreneurs) 
participates. Secondly, we are to identify feasible alternative forms for governance of diverse 
type of transacting. Next, we should specify various kinds of (transaction) costs associated 
with different type of organisation. Finally, we are to assess comparative efficiency of 
alternative governing structures according to the criteria (minimum) transaction costs. 
 
Main types of transactions of farm entrepreneur are associated with the supply of “factors” of 
production and marketing of farm output and services. Actually, farm manager manages not 
(production) technology but transactions related with production. It is not a hypothetical case 
when an entrepreneur is entirely engaged in managing transactions rather than participating in 
production activity - he hires all labor for carrying technological operations, and spends all 
time for governing contractual relations with inputs and service suppliers and buyers.  
 
Major types of transactions in farming are associated with: labor supply, supply of land and 
other natural resources, service supply, inputs supply, knowledge supply, innovation supply, 
finance supply, insurance supply, and realization (marketing) of output and services. In 
addition, the farms entrepreneur takes part in a great variety collective actions for inducing 
public (Government) intervention in market and private transactions in his own interests [1]. 
 
In rare cases there is only one practically possible form for governance of agrarian activity. For 
example, in Japanese dispersed paddy agriculture water supply could not be conducted by 
individual farmers (high interdependency, nonseparability of water use) and since earliest 
period water use organization developed as public organization. Often the choice of governing 
mode is determined by institutional restrictions as some forms for carrying farming activities, 
land and labor supply, trade of output etc. could be socially unacceptable or illegal3. For 
instance, corporate and cooperative organization of farming is forbidden in many countries; 
market trade of farmland (natural resources) and some outputs (inputs) is illegitimate etc. 
 
Usually, there are a big variety of practically possible (alternative) forms for organization of 
each agrarian activity (transaction). One extreme is to govern all transactions via free market 
through spot-market or classical contracts for inputs supply and marketing. For example, 
leasing-in farmland and long-term material assets, purchasing all services for cultivation and 
harvesting of output, purchasing all short-term material assets, selling all primary products on 
market. Another extreme is a close internal organization such as one-person or group subsistent 
farm - farmer(s) employ only own resources (land, labor, technological knowledge) and 
consume whole product. Between these two polls there is a spectrum of feasible modes for 
governing of transactions: various sort of long-term contracts, association, cooperation, 
interlinked organization, diverse hybrid forms, firms of different kind (partnerships, 
corporations, complex hierarchical forms) etc4. Identification of practically employed specific 
                                                       
3 Nevertheless, when transaction costs associated with governance is not high (possibility for 
disclosure low, enforcement and punishment insignificant) while benefits are considerable, 
then more effective modes prevail - large gray/black economies are common in agriculture.  
4 E.g. transaction associated with cultivation of land by tractor can be governed in different 
ways: a farmer can buy (unified ownership), rent (rent contract) or lease a tractor (input and 
credit supply interlinked contract); farmer could buy cultivation service from market (contract 
forms for transactions in different countries is object of a special micro-economic survey. 
 
5. “MEASURMENT” OF TRANSACTION COSTS 
 
One direction for evaluation of efficiency of agrarian organizations is direct comparison of 
costs for each transaction in different forms. Organization which requires less costs for is more 
efficient. For instance, comparison is made whether would be more economical direct (own) 
marketing of output or using a marketing cooperative. Data for some part of transaction costs 
can be found in traditional statistics and accountancy (e.g. management costs, marketing costs). 
Another part of transaction costs may be easily specified - costs for licensing and registration, 
agro-market information, promotion and marketing of output, general management, hiring 
lawyers and court suits, guarding property and yields, payment of bribes etc. However, a 
significant portion of transaction costs is either very difficult (too expensive) or impossible to 
be determined. In that group we can include the costs for finding best partners, negotiation, 
controlling and enforcement of contractual terms, organizational development, interlinked 
transacting, unrealized (failed) deals etc. Besides, it is often extremely complicated to separate 
transaction costs from traditional production expenditures5. For example, while executing 
farming operations a farmer supervises hired labor; during transportation of chemicals he 
negotiates marketing of output etc. Approximate estimate for the level of transaction costs 
could be made by interviewing farm managers. Here it is essential to indicate the level (high, 
low) of efforts and time devoted for governing different type of transactions: for finding 
needed labor for hiring, land and material inputs for purchase and lease-in; negotiating terms 
of exchange; monitoring implementation of contractual obligations; current adaptation of 
contracts to emerging new conditions; conflicts resolution; memberships in professional 
organizations; relationships with agrarian bureaucracy etc. 
 
Component comparison of transacting costs could not always give idea for efficiency of 
organizations. Very often alternative form decreases one type of costs while increasing another 
type transacting costs – e.g. internalization of a transaction (replacement of market with 
integral mode) is associated with reduction of costs for information supply (overcoming 
market uncertainty), permanent (re)negotiations along with constantly changing conditions, 
safeguarding investments from outside opportunism. On the other hand, it enlarges costs for 
                                                                                                                                                      
service); number of farmers may buy a tractor (joint ownership) and use it in a group 
(producers cooperative) or individually; farmer can join a cooperative providing cultivation 
services (non for profit organization); he may lease his land out to a tractor owner and share 
output (share tenancy contract); farmer can hire a tractorist to work on his farm (employment 
contract) and he may even sell cultivation service to market (profit making organization); 
cultivation service to farms could be subsidized by Government (trilateral mode), or provided 
by a municipality or state company (public organization) etc. 
5 All these “measurement problems” make it impossible to extend the traditional Neoclassical 
models simply by adding a new "transacting" activity [13]. 
organizational formation, decision making, integral management, supervising and motivation 
of hired labor etc. In our previous example with alternatives for marketing of farm output the 
“internal realization” (personal consumption, production “consumption”, processing) could be 
chosen as more efficient form to direct sell or use of marketing cooperative. Moreover, a good 
part of transactions in agriculture is governed not by “pure” but through complex or interlinked 
modes - e.g. inputs supply in a “package” with know-how, extension or/and service supply; 
joint supply of inputs and credit; crediting of production against marketing of output etc. Thus, 
it is important to take into consideration overall (total) costs for organization of transactions of 
different types - all external and internal transaction costs of the farm. 
 
Often it is difficult to select a base for comparison in view that the high transacting costs 
entirely block development of alternative organization. For instance, market for agrarian credit 
did not emerged in East Europe during most of the transition and internal supply (utilization of 
own finance, direct outside co-investment) was the only possible form for finance supply of 
farms [7]. Here the comparative level of transaction costs is impossible to be determined and 
appreciate “high” efficiency of the integral mode for finance supply. In that case funding with 
“own means” and with “bank credit” are not real alternative at all but completely different 
governing structures. Thus, broadly applied indicators for estimation of comparative efficiency 
of investments based on “opportunity costs” (discounting, payback period, internal rate of 
return) independent from the form of funding, have no significant economic sense. 
 
6. FACTORS OF TRANSACTION COSTS 
 
Another direction for evaluation of efficiency is the discrete structural analysis of alternative 
governing forms [4]. Since it is either very difficult or impossible to determine transaction 
costs for individual mode, assessment is made on comparative costs of alternative 
organizations. Besides, quantitative approach (absolute and relative measures, marginalism) is 
replaced by qualitative (structural) analysis and indirect assessment of transacting costs. 
Actually, we are interested not in absolute level of transaction costs in different form, but in 
organization with the lowest comparative costs for a particular transaction. Initially we have to 
identify critical factors of transactions in the specific market, institutional and natural 
environment. These factors are responsible for variation of transacting costs and are associated 
with: behavioral characteristics of agrarian agents – bounded rationality, tendency for 
opportunism, reputation building, risk taking, level of trust,; and with economic dimensions of 
individual transactions - frequency, uncertainty, assets specificity, and appropriability [1, 4]. 
 
Transaction costs have two behavioral origins: individual’s bounded rationality and 
opportunism [4]. Agrarian agents do not possess full information about economic system 
(price ranges, demands, trade opportunities, development trends) since collection and 
processing of such information would be either very expensive or impossible (for future events, 
partners intention for cheating). In order to optimize decision-making they have to spent costs 
for “increasing imperfect rationality” (data collection, analysis, forecasting, training etc.). 
 
Furthermore, economic agents are given to opportunism. Accordingly, if there is opportunity 
for some of transacting sides to get non-punishably an extra rent from exchange he/she will 
likely do so6. It is very costly or impossible to distinguish opportunistic from non-opportunistic 
behavior (because of bounded rationality). Therefore, agrarian agents have to protect their 
transactions from hazard of opportunism through: ex ante efforts to find a reliable counterpart 
and to design efficient mode for partners credible commitments; and ex post investments for 
overcoming (through monitoring, controlling, stimulating cooperation) of possible 
opportunism during contract execution stage [4]. 
 
In addition, transaction costs depend on “critical dimensions” of each transaction. When 
recurrence of transactions between same partners is high, both sides are interested in working 
out a special form for standardization of their ongoing relationships (building incentive 
structure, adjustment mechanisms, conflict resolution devices). Continuation of relationships 
with a particular partner and designing a special mode for transacting has a high economic 
value. Parties restrain for opportunism which detection is “punished” by turning to competitor 
(losing future business). Besides, costs for development of a special mode could be effectively 
recovered for repeated transactions. When a transaction is incidental then possibility for 
opportunism is great since cheating side can not be easily punished (good reputation is not of 
value). Transaction costs become very high (and may block transacting) when low frequency 
coincides with high uncertainty and requirement for large relation-specific investments. 
 
When uncertainty surrounding transactions increases then costs for overcoming uncertainty go 
up (bounded rationality is crucial and opportunism can emerged). Agrarian agents will seek, 
develop, and use such modes of organization which diminish transaction uncertainty - internal 
integration, cooperation, rational (relational) contract etc. There are strong mutual incentives to 
develop a special form for repeated transacting when high uncertainty is combined with 
significant relation specific investments. When transacting between same counterparts is rare, 
and it is not supported by specific assets, and appropriability of rights is high, then faceless 
(autonomous) market exchange is the most efficient mode. Depending on the levels of 
uncertainty and their risk aversion the agrarian agents will take different entrepreneurial risk 
                                                       
6 Two major forms of opportunism can be distinguished [4]: pre-contractual ("adverse 
selection") - when some of the partners use "information asymmetry" to negotiate better 
contract terms; and post-contractual ("moral hazard") - when some counterpart takes an 
advantage of impossibility for full observation on his activities (by another partner or by a 
third party) or when he take "legal advantages" of unpredicted changes in transacting 
conditions (costs, prices etc.). Special third form of opportunism occurs in development of 
larger organizations [15]. Since individual benefits are often not proportional to individual 
efforts, everybody tends to expect others to invest costs for organizational development, and to 
benefit ("free ride") from the new organization. 
and will get normal, low or extra than average rate of return from transactions. 
 
Transaction costs are very high when some of the parties is to make specific for the transaction 
with a particular partner investments. In this case it is impossible to change a partner of 
transaction (alternative use of assets) without a big loss in value of specific capital7. Specific 
investments are “locked” in relationships with particular partner (personality of partner 
matters) and they cannot be returned-back by “faceless” market exchange. Costless 
redeployment (alternative use) of specific assets is not possible if transactions fail to occur, 
they are prematurely terminated, or less favorable terms are renegotiated (in contract renewal 
time and before end of life-span of specific capital). Thus, if transaction requires significant 
specific investments agents will have to design a special mode to safeguard their investments 
from expropriation (possible opportunism) – tied-up contracts, quasi/complete integration etc.  
 
If symmetrical assets dependency (regime of bilateral trade) exists there are strong incentives 
in both parties to elaborate a special private mode of governance. However, when unilateral 
dependency exists then dependent side (facing mini/total monopoly) has to protect investments 
against possible opportunism (behavioral uncertainty) either through integrating transactions 
(unified organization, joint ownership, cooperative)8; or safeguarding them with interlinked 
contract, exchange of economic hostages, development of collective organization to outstand 
asymmetrical dependency (for price negotiation, for lobbying for Government regulations) etc. 
 
Serious transacting problems arise when condition of assets specificity is combined with high 
uncertainty and low frequency of transactions. In this case elaboration of a special governing 
structure for private transacting is not justified (set up costs can not be recovered by occasional 
transactions). Specific investments are not made and transactions fail to occur. Third party 
involvement (local authority, Government agency, NGO, hybrid organization) in individual 
transacting (through assistance, arbitration, regulation) is crucial for smooth organization of 
transaction. Special mode for trilateral transacting such as neoclassical contract is invented to 
manage transactions with high uncertainty and asset specificity, and low frequency9. 
 
Transacting is particularly difficult when appropriability of rights is low [5, 14]. In this case 
possibility for unwanted (unequal) market or private exchange is great10. For transactions with 
                                                       
7 If investment in specific capital is not made, transactions either can not take place or it could 
occur without (or loss of) comparative advantages in respect of productivity [1]. 
8 When technological opportunities for economy on scale (scope) on specific assets can be 
achieved. Otherwise integration of transactions will be lost-making comparing to outside price 
(production costs) competition. 
9 arranging a “third party participation” - e.g. determination of grades of wine, certification of 
special (eco, fair-trade, origins) products by an authorized agency. 
10 “Natural” low appropriability has most of agrarian intellectual products: agro-market 
information, agro-meteorological forecasts, a big part of new agrarian technologies and, 
low appropriability the costs and benefits are independent for individual participants. Because 
of bounded rationality the transaction costs for protection, detection, verification, and a 
third-party (e.g. court) punishment of unwanted exchange (non paying 
consumers-opportunists) are extremely high. Principally, when the appropriability associated 
with a transaction is low, there is no pure market mode to protect and carry out activity 
effectively. Nevertheless, the respecting others rights (unwanted exchange avoided) or 
“granting” additional rights to others (needed transactions carried) could be governed by a 
“good will” or charity actions. For instance, a great number of voluntary environmental 
initiatives emerged driven by competition, farmers’ preferences for eco-production, responds 
to public pressure for a sound eco-management [5]. In any case, voluntary initiatives could 
hardly satisfy the entire social demand especially if they require significant costs.  
 
If appropriability is low and transactions are strongly specific (for a particular customer) the 
only way to carry them out is to integrate transactions (in house production, trade secrets) or 
elaborate effective form for securing credible commitment (joint investments, interlinks). 
Some private modes could be employed if a high frequency (a pay-back on investment is 
possible) and a mutual assets dependency (thus incentive to cooperate) exists11. In these 
instances, unwritten accords, interlinking, bilateral or collective agreements, close-membership 
cooperatives, codes of professional behavior, alliances, internal organization etc. are used.  
 
Serious transaction difficulties occur (and may block transacting) when they are associated 
with low appropriability but require significant specific/universal investments, and are 
characterized with low frequency and high uncertainty12. Incidental character of transactions 
between same agents makes designing and maintenance costs for a special (private, collective) 
large-members organization for dealing with low appropriability very high (“free-riding” 
problem). Thus, there is a strong need for a “third-party” public (Government, local authority, 
international assistance) intervention in order to make such activity possible or more effective 
– public organization, public contracts, mandatory fees, introduction of new property right etc.  
 
7. DISCRETE STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 
 
Next step is to evaluate effective potential of alternative modes: to minimize bounded 
rationality of agrarian agents and uncertainty surrounding transactions; for appropriation and 
protection of absolute (determined by dominating institutions) and contracted rights (and 
                                                                                                                                                      
software for agriculture etc. Besides, all products (and activities) with big positive or negative 
externalities (spillovers) are to be included in this group [12]. 
11 For instance, inter-dependency between a dairy farm and a milk processor in a remote 
region (capacity and site dependency); or a bee keeper and a neighboring orchard farm 
(symmetric dependency between needs of flower and needs for pollination).   
12 That is when pay-back on investment requires “mass” consumption and “collective 
appropriation” of benefits (and risk taking). 
associated private benefits and investment) from possible opportunism; to recover long-term 
costs for organizational development through high frequency of transactions; to explore 
economy of size and scale on specific for transacting with a particular partner capital etc.  
 
Different governance forms are alternative but not equal modes for organization of 
transactions - they have different features (advantages and disadvantages) to coordinate, 
control, and stimulate (maximize benefits of, minimize costs on) transactions. Since 
transactions have different critical dimensions and governance forms have different 
comparative advantages the operationalisation of the concept is done by: “aligning 
transactions (which differ in their attributes) with governance structures (which differ in their 
costs and competence) in discriminating (mainly transaction cost economizing) way” [4]. 
 
Limited rationality of agents (lack of access to all information for optimal decision making, 
impossibility for processing information, deficiency of managerial experience) increases 
transaction costs, and thus there will be sleeked effective forms which diminish bounded 
rationality (investment for information supply, training, integration of transactions, using 
special organization). Possibility for opportunism of counterparts (unwanted and 
non-punishable “exchange”) also boosts transaction costs, and hence preferences would be 
given to forms restricting opportunism and protecting investment from unwanted expropriation 
(contract specification, using economic hostages, join investment, ownership integration). 
Built reputation (good or bed) and existence of trust between partners, reduce transaction costs 
making easier or blocking transactions. Finally, depending of their risk aversion individuals 
will have different transaction costs for investments connected with significant uncertainty.  
 
In general, internal structure has advantage for governing transaction with high uncertainty 
and specificity (dependency) of assets, since it diminishes bounded rationality and protects 
investments from outside opportunism. Contrary, transactions with high certainty (bounded 
rationality is not important) and universal character of assets (opportunism can not be realized 
since transaction can be executed with another partner without additional costs) can be carried 
across free market without encountering costs for development of a special private mode. 
Private organization is effective only for transactions with high recurrence between same 
partners, since occasional (single) transactions do not let recovering ("payback" on) investment 
for development of a special governance mode (mechanisms for coordination, stimulation, 
dispute resolution; formal registration etc.). Finally, markets and private forms are appropriate 
for transactions with high appropriability, since during exchange they would recover invested 
resources. For transaction with low appropriability private rights cannot be protected or they 
are enforced with extremely high costs. Thus, such transactions could be effectively governed 
either by hybrid (mixed public-private, quasi-public) or entirely public forms for organization. 
 
After specification of potential of individual forms, we can build a principle scheme with 
generic types for governing of transactions with different critical dimensions (Figure 1). For 
transactions with different combination of specific characteristics there would be suitable 
different effective forms for governing: part of agrarian transactions will be managed through 
free market exchange; another part will be organized through a special contract mode(s); part 
of transactions will be entirely internally integrated (firm), and another portion protected 
though a special private organization(s) outside of farm gates (cooperation, association). 
 
Figure 1: Principle modes for governing of agrarian transactions 
Critical dimensions of transactions 
Appropriability 
High Low 
Assets Specificity 
Low High 
Uncertainty 
Low High Low High 
Frequency 
 
 
 
Generic modes 
High Low High Low  High Low  High Low 
 
Free market h h  
Special contract   h h  
Internal organization  h h  
Third-party 
involvement 
 K K  
Public intervention  K 
  h - the most effective mode; K - a necessity for a third party involvement 
 
When transactions between same parties are occasional, but they are characterized with 
significant uncertainty, and they are with increasing or high specificity of assets, then there is 
no pure market or private mode for effective organization ("market failure", "contract failure"). 
Here a third part involvement (state, local authority, international assistance, private agent) is 
necessary to make such transactions more efficient or possible at all. 
 
8. ECONOMIC BOUNDARIES OF FARM AND AGRARIAN ORGANIZATIONS  
 
Lastly the range of feasible organization forms for each generic mode is to be identified. 
Variety of “internal organization” in agriculture includes: one-person farm/firm, family 
farm/firm, group farm/firm (partnership), cooperative, corporation, public farm/firm, joint 
venture etc. Corresponding forms of “free market” are: spot exchange on local/regional 
markets; classical contract, wholesale trade etc. The “special contract form| could be: 
short-term contract, long-term contract, relational contract, interlinked organization, 
multilateral agreement etc. List of alternative governance mode is to be completed via special 
micro-economic study. 
 
Finally, we are (and able) to determine the effective (horizontal and vertical) boundaries of 
agrarian organizations of different type. Individual forms in each generic type should be 
evaluated for their potential to explore economy of scale/size of specialized and/or specific 
capital, and comparative efficiency to minimize bounded rationality and control opportunism 
of participants. For instance, one-person farm/firm has zero internal transaction costs (one 
agent), but limited possibility for investment in specialized/specific human and material capital. 
“Internal” opportunities for increasing productivity (through investments, exploring economy 
of scale/size) increases along with extension of members of coalition (group farm, 
partnerships) but that is also associated with enlargement of costs for making the coalition 
(finding complementary and reliable partners) and the internal costs for managing the coalition 
(for coordination, reducing bounded rationality, controlling opportunism etc.). Separation of 
ownership from management (cooperative, corporation) gives enormous opportunities for 
productivity growth but it is connected with huge transacting costs (for decreasing information 
asymmetry between management and shareholders, decision making, controlling opportunism 
of hired labor and between partners). Special contract combines the potential for greater 
“control” on transactions with possibility to explore advantages of further specialization of 
activity. Nevertheless, it could be connected with large costs for preparing and enforcement of 
contracts for complex occasional transactions with high unilateral dependency. Boundaries of 
agrarian markets extend along with development of specialization and standardization of 
agrarian recourses, technologies, and products, and institutional conditions for protecting of 
private (absolute and contract) rights. However, market governance could be associated with 
high uncertainty, risk, and costs due to price instability, great possibility for facing 
opportunistic behavior, “missing market” situation etc. 
 
Economic cooperation and exchanges let more profitable use of resources but also require 
additional costs. Farmers and other economic agents will tend to govern their activity and 
relations though the most effective forms – that which maximize their benefits and minimize 
their costs. Therefore, the most effective form and size of farm will be determined through 
optimization of total (production and transacting) costs, and trade-offs between the gain in the 
productivity/benefits and the gain in transacting costs. Hence farm will be efficient if it 
manages all transactions in the most profitable for the owner(s) way. Expected benefits for 
farmers could range from the monetary or non-monetary income; profit; indirect revenue; 
pleasure of self-employment or family enterprise; enjoyment of agricultural activities; desire 
for involvement in eco-preservation; increased leisure time; to other non-economic benefits.  
 
In the specific institutional environment (legal framework, support policies, tradition, access to 
new technology, level of transacting costs) various types of farm will have quite different 
effective horizontal and vertical boundaries. For instance, in transitional conditions of high 
market and institutional uncertainty, and inefficient property rights and contract enforcement 
system, most of the agrarian investments happened to be in a regime of high specificity 
(dependency). As a result (over)integrated modes such as low productive subsistent household 
and group farming, or large production cooperatives and agro-companies, have been 
dominating in Bulgaria and East Europe [Bachev, 2006]. Alternatively, in more matured 
economies, where markets are developed and institutions stable, agrarian assets are with more 
universal character. Therefore, farm borders are greatly determined by family borders, and 
more market and mixed (contract rather than entirely integrated) forms prevail. 
 
Thus that is a question of trade-off (comparison of benefits) between the increase in 
productivity and the growth of transacting costs, and of minimization of overall (production 
plus transaction) costs of farm. Such comparison not always (most often) is quantitatively 
measured. However, that calculation is always made by business managers and (rational) 
economic agents. Economic science should not ignore “immeasurable” costs of transaction but 
to seek adequate forms for their incorporation into efficiency analysis.  
 
At this stage of analysis it becomes clear the inadequacy of suggested indicators for 
productivity of production costs and resources for estimation of efficiency of different 
organizations. The opposite is true - it has to be expected significant differences in the rate of 
profitability on investments in an agro-firm (profit making organization) from the "pay-back" 
of expenditures and resources in a cooperative (member oriented organization), a public farm 
(non-for profit organization) or in a subsistence farm (giving opportunity for productive use of 
otherwise "non-tradable" resources such as family labor, land etc.). 
 
Traditional statistical, accountancy etc. data are little suitable to test and apply our new 
approach. Here it is necessary to get micro-economic data for different transactions governed 
by divers type farms as well as costs and benefits associated with alternative governing structures. 
For this purpose it has to be organized interviews with managers of different kind of farms. 
Questions should give information for the specific characteristics of transactions of particular 
type and for associated transacting costs. Besides direct indicators (e.g. frequency of deals with 
the same partner, term of contract) it should be also used appropriate proxy indicators for 
expression of uncertainty of transactions, specificity and dependency of assets etc. – e.g. 
whether there is an alternative supplier (buyer); reason for selecting a particular supplier or 
buyer (the best price, delayed payments, receiving supplementary service); dentity of the 
partner (relative, friend, member organization); factors which make difficult procurement or 
sell (finding a partner, high price level, non-fulfillment of negotiated terms). Goal of analysis 
is not only to test adequacy of suggested approach, but also to identify transaction difficulties, 
and suggest directions for improvement of public policy and business strategies. 
 
 
 
9. IMPLICATIONS FOR AGRARIAN POLICIES 
 
Transaction costs analysis let us specify existing and emerging problems (difficulties, costs, 
risks, failures) in the organization of market and private transactions, and define the economic 
role of government as well as design effective forms for public intervention in agrarian sector.  
 
The appropriate government involvement is to create an environment for: decreasing the 
uncertainty surrounding market and private transactions, and increasing the intensity of 
exchange, and protecting private rights and investments, and making private investments less 
dependent etc. For instance, the State establishes and enforces quality, safety and 
eco-standards for farm inputs and produces, certifies producers and users of natural resources, 
regulates employment relations, transfers water management rights to farms associations, sets 
up minimum farm-gate prices etc. All that facilitates and intensifies (market and private) 
transactions and increases efficiency.   
 
Next, practically possible modes for increasing appropriability have to be considered. The low 
appropriability of activity (transaction) is often caused by unspecified or badly specified 
private rights [1]. In some cases, the most effective government intervention would be to 
introduce and enforce new private property rights – e.g. rights on natural, biological, and 
environmental resources; tradable quotas for polluting; private rights on intellectual agrarian 
property and origins etc. That would be efficient when the privatization of resources or the 
introduction (and enforcement) of new rights is not associated with significant costs 
(uncertainty, recurrence, and level of specific investment are low). That Government 
intervention effectively transfers the organization of transactions into the market and private 
governance, liberalizes market competition and induces private incentives (and investments) in 
certain activities (the relevant part in Figure 1). 
 
When the appropriability associated with an activity and transaction is low, there is no pure 
market mode to protect and carry out activity effectively [1]. Therefore, there is a strong need 
for a third-party public (Government, local authority, international assistance etc.) intervention 
in order to make such activity possible or more effective. For example, the supply of 
environmental goods by farmers could hardly be governed through private contracts with the 
individual consumers because of the low appropriability, high uncertainty, and rare character 
of transacting (the high costs for negotiating, contracting, charging all potential consumers, 
disputing etc.). At the same time, the supply of additional environmental protection and 
improvement service is very costly (in terms of production and organization costs) and would 
unlikely be carried out on a voluntary basis. Besides, the financial compensation 
(price-premium) of farmers by the willing consumers through a pure market mode is also 
ineffective due to the high information asymmetry, massive enforcement costs etc. A 
third-party mode with a direct public involvement would make that transaction effective: on 
behalf of the consumers the State agency negotiates with the individual farmers a contract for 
“environment conservation and improvement service”, coordinates activities of various agents 
(including a direct production management), provides public payments for the compensation 
of farmers, and controls the implementation of negotiated terms. 
 
When market and private sector fails and the needed public intervention does not take place 
(under or over-intervention) then the sustainable agrarian development is significantly 
compromised – small-scale and subsistence farming, primitive technologies, blocking of all 
class of important activities and transactions (agrarian finance, insurance, extension, 
infrastructural development) come out as a result [5].  
 
10. CONCLUSION 
 
In unreal economy "without transaction costs" the theory of agrarian organization is very 
simple - there are no agrarian organizations (farms, firms, cooperative etc.). Here the single 
mechanism for governing (organizing, coordinating) all economic activities is the free market. 
“Situation of efficiency” is easily achieved since agrarian agents (individuals, households, 
firms) automatically and costlessly adapt their behavior according to movements of market 
prices and changes in production technologies. In the real agrarian economy “with transaction 
costs” there is also place for other effective (non market) modes for optimization of resource 
use - group farms, cooperatives, contractual arrangements, public firms, hybrid forms. “The 
old” problem of efficiency founds a "new" dimension through incorporation into analysis of 
the costs of transacting (in addition to production expenditures). Moreover, accent is put on 
evaluation of comparative efficiency of all (rather then only a part) of alternative modes for 
organization of agrarian transactions – “free market” as one extreme and “subsistent farm” 
or/and |complete (public or private) hierarchy” as another poll(s). It also becomes absurd usage 
of traditional approaches of “black box” in analysis of governing structures and productivity as 
an indicator for efficiency of different agrarian organizations. 
 
Our new framework helps us better understand the factors for sustainable development and the 
“Government’s role” as well. The analyses of transaction costs identify an immense range of 
“market failures” associated with unspecified or badly specified property rights; inefficient 
system for enforcement of absolute and contracted rights; high uncertainty and dependency of 
activity, and low appropriability of rights. The economic agents deal with market deficiency 
developing different non-market forms for effective governance (contracts, internal modes, 
collective actions etc.). Nonetheless, private sector also “fails” to safeguard individual rights 
and carry out certain activities at effective scale. That is particularly true for human and 
eco-rights, technological and infrastructural development, management of non-renewable 
resources, environmental conservation activity etc. Thus there is a strong need for a third-party 
public involvement in market and private transactions though institutional modernization, 
assistance, regulation, hybrid or public organization.  
 
However, diverse forms of public interventions are with unequal efficiency and the most 
efficient one is to be selected taking into account the overall transaction costs and contribution 
to sustainable development. Nevertheless, “government failure” is also possible, and 
inappropriate involvements, under or over-regulations, mismanagement, corruption etc. are 
widespread around the world. Agrarian sustainability is significantly compromised when 
market and private sector fails, and no effective public intervention takes place - imperfect 
institutional structure is not reformed, delayed or bad government interventions prevail, 
fruitless international assistance dominate, and needed global governance is not established. 
 
That new concept of efficiency is inseparable part of new understanding of the essence and 
economic role of agrarian organizations. However, transaction costs economizing is not only a 
modern academic concept but a real practice in the world we are living in. Here arguments 
such as “transaction costs are difficult to measure” and therefore “they will be ignored in 
assessment of efficiency” are not acceptable - not only in research works, but in the farm 
management and agrarian policies design. . 
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